



CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE

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
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
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I N T R O D U C T I O N

Political process is concerned with who gets what, when and how. Because of the scarcity of social resources the social system has never been able to satisfy the demands of all members of the society to their satisfaction. Consequently, conflict over the scarce social values and resources is the inevitable result. Power is then used to exercise various forms of influence to get what one wants. In this way, *Machten-faltung* (the ability to show and exercise power) is a natural corollary of this process.

Violence is a continuation of this bargaining process but by different means. It is a very rational technique though it may be used by unreasonable men. The need for violence is always present in a society pregnant with tensions resulting from social scarcity. Only the spark is needed and provided. Who provides the spark determines the utility of violence. But the nature and need of violence may be explained in terms of social bargaining, where violence becomes a continuation of the political process and is a tool, a method and a technique to achieve the desired objectives.

The present study is an attempt to analyse the typology, sources and nature of violence in this theoretical paradigm. Conceptual framework has been advanced that whatever be the

Chapter - I

POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND NEED FOR VIOLENCE

"All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence", says C. Wright Mills,¹ almost echoing Max Weber's classic definition of the state as "the rule of men over men based on the means of legitimate, that is, allegedly legitimate, violence"². Politics is, actually, the study of who gets what, when and how. Political process is, thus, concerned with the distribution of social values. In case of an agreement on values, or on harmony about the ends and means, there would be no need to change the behaviour of others. Consequently, there would be no political system in the absence of influence power relation. If, as according to Robert Dahl, the behaviour of others is sought to be changed by "creating the expectations of sizeable rewards or deprivations", then relations of power come into existence.³ Because perfect harmony among individuals is not possible, political system involving relations of influence and power results.

In the political process, power signifies the capacity to regulate the behaviour of others towards particular objectives.⁴ It is the process of regulating the behaviour of others

1. Mills, C. Wright The Power Elite.

2. Weber, Max. "The Power Elite", 1956, p. 171.

3. Dahl, Robert A. Modern Political Analysis, p. 12.

4. Lasswell, Harold & Kaplan Morton. "Power and Society", p.75.

by the threat of value-deprivations in case of non-conformity with the behaviour sought. It is the ability to restrain, transport, immobilise, injure, destroy or direct human energy (that is, attitudes and behaviour) to realise values sought by the modification and control of rewards and deprivations.⁵ In this, power is a means, a technique for the achievement of ends other than power. Pursuit of social values involves, therefore, a struggle for power, and distribution of social values is the function of political process. Thus, it may be said that politics is the "shaping, distribution and exercise of power".⁶ Power is thus a phenomenon of group cohesion and aggregation, a function of social relations of men. Ultimately, this power is vested in the state. As Weber has described, a state is "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory."⁷ Thus, according to Erich Kaufman, the essence of the state is "Machtenfaltung" — which is, development, increase and display of power, coupled with the ability to successfully assert itself.⁸

Conflict is present in organised society and controlling it is the control function of political processes. The so-called political arena operates at the center of carefully regulated

5. Neiberg, H.L. Political violence ; The Behavioral Process . p. 10.

6. Lasswell and Kaplan, Ibid, p. 75.

7. Mills, C. Wright and Gerth, H. "From Max Weber ; Essays in Sociology".

8. Precht, Arnold. Political Theory . p. 345.

struggle within a shifting, but generally agreed upon, set of rules substituting competition for conflict. Mack and Snyder have made a very useful distinction between competition and conflict.⁹ Competition involves striving for scarce resources according to sets of rules governing the tactics to be used by competitor, and total destruction of the opposition is not considered to be competition. Conflict occurs when competitors disregard rules or when they seek to destroy each other in their quest for scarce resources. In fact, political competition/conflict relationship is best visualised as a continuum ranging from competitive non-violent/^{non-}destructive behaviour in conformity with rules at one extreme to conflict-violent-destructive behaviour in violation of established norms at the other, with much of the intervening behaviour being neither clearly competition nor clearly conflict.

Power is the tool both for competition and conflict. Struggle for power involves the struggle to acquire the legitimacy of power and the instrument of force, both of which are ultimately vested in the state. The state is also the ultimate source for the distribution of social values. It is, therefore, natural and inevitable that social groups must struggle to acquire the legitimacy of power, the ability to evoke compliance, so as to achieve the desired social values by sharing in the state's monopoly of armed violence.

⁹ B. Mack and P. Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict - Toward an overview and Synthesis", Journal of Conflict Resolution. June, 1957, p. 217.

Political competition and conflict in organised society arise over "position and resource scarcity" within an organised structure of rewards.¹⁰ Position scarcity is there because no two people can occupy the same position in the reward structure at the same time, nor can one individual occupy two different positions simultaneously. Only a small number of people can occupy positions of great power, privilege and prestige. Since many seek them, and since only a few can fill such a limited number of valued positions, conflict frequently develops over them.

Thus, politics always presupposes the existence of conflict. In its collective sense, conflict is a process, a condition and also an event. Galtung defines it as a condition: "an action system is said to be in conflict if the system has two or more incompatible states."¹¹ It is also a process in the sense that it is struggle over values when opponents try to neutralise each other.¹² In this way, conflict arises out of scarcity, or when something is blocking the access to the desired goal, or when rival efforts to obtain some value can be seen as the source of frustration.

We may give certain common qualities which are present in all social conflicts, and these would include; at least two parties, or distinct units or entities having some minimum

10. *Ibid.*, p. 218.

11. Galtung, John. "Institutionalised conflict Resolution", *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 4 of 1965, p. 348.

12. Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*. p. 44.

degree of contact with and visibility to, each other; mutually exclusive and/or mutually incompatible values based on resource scarcity or position scarcity; behaviours designed to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise control another party or parties; a relationship in which the parties can gain (relatively) only at each other's expense; mutually opposed actions and counter actions; attempts to acquire power (i.e., to gain control of scarce resources and positions), or to exercise power (i.e. to influence behaviour in certain directions), or the actual acquisition or exercise of power.

Such properties would make a conflict a particular kind of social interaction process or "interaction relationships" between parties who have mutually exclusive or incompatible values.¹³ To achieve the desired value goals in this condition/process/event, individuals and social groups resort to force and violence, which thus becomes a method and technique for goal achievement.

A distinction which can be made is one between changes "within" and changes of or, in other words conflict "within" and conflicts "about" the system. For instance, Coser proposes "to talk of a change of system when all major structural relations, its basic institutions and its prevailing value system has been drastically altered, but, in concrete historical reality, no clear cut distinction exists".¹⁴ More specifically, Marshall

13. Mack & Snyder. *Ibid*, pp. 217-219.

14. Lewis. A coser. "Social conflict and social change", *British Journal of Sociology*, September, 1957, p. 202.

distinguishes "conflict that arises out of the division of labour, conflict, that is to say, over the terms on which cooperation is to take place, as illustrated by a wage dispute between the employer and employed", from conflict over the system itself upon which the allocation of functions and the distribution of benefits are based.¹⁵

Because much of social conflict is rooted in scarcity of valued material rewards, it may be said that such conflicts are economic in origin. But, in spite of greater material abundance in industrialized countries, economic conflict has not disappeared there. Large gaps between the rich and poor are normally accepted in traditional societies, but they become irritants in modernizing countries because of torrents of rising expectations.

Karl Marx was the foremost proponent of a class-view of history, according to which, economic conflict, which is eventually politicised, takes the form of conflict among economic classes over distribution of rewards. On the basis of the Marxian theory that the state is an instrument of oppression and force used by the ruling class to keep the exploited classes in subjugation, Lenin says, "The state is a product and the manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonisms. The state arises where, when, and in so far as class antagonisms objectively cannot be reconciled. And,

15. Marshall, T.H. "The Nature of class conflict", in T.H. Marshall, (ed) class conflict and social stratification.

conversely, the existence of the state proves that the class antagonisms are irreconcilable According to Marx, the state is an organ of class rule, an organ for the oppression of one class by another, it is the creation of order, which legalises and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the conflict between the classes it is obvious that the liberation of the oppressed class is impossible not only without a violent revolution, but also without the destruction of the apparatus of state power which was created by the ruling class and which is the embodiment of this 'alienation'." ¹⁶

For Lenin and Mao, "Under conditions of specifiable kind, well organised violence is the shortest distance between two points". ¹⁷ This is in keeping with the Marxian line that violence and political revolution are inter-wind, and that political revolution by itself does not create change but only expresses transition from one economic system to another. It is this premise that leads to Mao's contention that "the central task and the highest form of revolution is to seize political power by armed force and decide issues by war." ¹⁸ It was Marx who had said that the revolutionary role of force is that it is the mid-wife of every old society which is pregnant with the new.

16. Lenin, V.I. "The state and Revolution", p. 154, quoted in Anatol Rapoport Conflict in Man made Environment. p. 151.

17. Bienen, Henry. Violence and Social Change p. 45.

18. Ibid. p. 70.

From among the non-Marxian theorists of violence, Hannah Arendt and Dahrendorf have emphasised the linkage between violence and change. Arendt considers violence as "the instrument of direct intervention in politics,"¹⁹ and, therefore, a theory of revolution can deal only with the justification for violence, and makes distinctions between violence as used for destroying existing power and violence as the necessary pre-requisite of change. Dahrendorf conceives of revolution as a rapid and violent socio-political change.²⁰

The Structural-Functionalist-Behavioralist scholars in political Science (Lucian Pye, Edward Shils, Clifford Geertz)²¹ maintain that the basic cause of internal violence is the lack of political integration due to ethnic, regional, Linguistic or communal splits and divisions. Pienen points out that "as people are being changed from traditionals into moderns, their sensitivity to being changed is a source of violence in traditional societies. Since change produces more insecurity, there must be quantitative increase in the degree of aggression and hostility within society."²²

19. Arendt, Hannah. On violence.

20. Dahrendorf P. Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford 1959)

21. Pye, Lucian. "Aspects of Political Development"; Shils, Edward. Political Development in the New States; Geertz, Clifford. Old Societies and New States.

22. Pienen, Henry. Opp.cit, p. 48.

This theoretical discussion leads us to the point where violence is actually used as a method for whatever be the cause. Dissatisfied and disgruntled elite, who may have organised groups having a deep sense of outrage and social injustice, possess capability for ensuring a planned demonstration and, at the same time, avoid incriminating themselves or provoking counter-action against themselves. Instead, they may carry out peaceful demonstrations which are designed to reveal their strength and intensity of their committed support. The "peaceful demonstrations" may provoke violent action against them or may cause governmental intervention, or some of the more inflammable followers may be ignited into unplanned outburst of violence. Such possibilities are always implicit in such volatile situations. In such situations, "responsible leaders" easily find themselves in the excellent position of minimum risks and maximum effectiveness. They start bargaining with formal authorities. They point out to the authorities that their just demands must be accepted, otherwise it would be difficult for them to control their people and "anti-social elements" may create a situation in which anything might happen. And if their prophecies are partially fulfilled, and there are sporadic outburst, it would be wrong to assume that the leaders would be genuinely sorry. Such events that can demonstrate violence, inducing others to make concessions, are not to be planned. Once the emotions are raised, the problem is to keep the events from happening. They may very well disown and

condemn the "anti-social elements mingling in the democratic people's peaceful movements and indulging in violence," but the bargaining power of the leaders is 'definitely enhanced'.

The need for violence is always present in a society pregnant with tensions resulting from social scarcity. Only the spark is needed and provided. Who provides the spark determines the utility of violence. But the nature and need of violence may be explained in terms of social bargaining, where violence becomes a continuation of the political process and is a tool, a method and a technique, to achieve desired objectives,

CHAPTER - II

TPOLOGY OF VIOLENCE

Violence, derived from the Latin word "violentia", is an act of physical force, It involves the infliction on other people of injury, physical or mental in character; it involves compulsion or restraint. It is the threat or use of force resulting, or intended to result, in the injury or forceable restraint or intimidation of persons or the destruction or forceable seizure of property.¹ Acts of violence are those which kill or injure persons or do significant damage to property. It is physical force used by a person, directly or through a weapon, to hurt, destroy or control another or to damage, destroy or control an object (e.g. property or territory).² Violence is the most distinct and severe form of physical force.

Violence is, "the exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on or cause damage to person or property, action or conduct characterised by this; treatment or usage tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with personal freedom."³

When people act against their will, desire, intention or inclination, it means they are being forced to do something

1. Progress Report of the U.S. National Commission on the causes and prevention of violence, US government, 1969, p. 3.

2. Haag, E.V., Political violence and civil Disobedience, p. 54.

3. Mackenzie, W.J.M. Power, Violence, Decision. Penguin, 1975, p. 39.

Force is the reserve capability and means of exercising physical power.⁴ Acts of force prevent the normal free acts of individuals, or which inhibit them through the threat of violence. To Aristotle, "Bia" means both force and violence - to make a thing move against its own natural internal tendency, when the cause of action lies in things outside the actor, and when the actor contributes nothing.⁵ Coercion is, any social compulsion - usually some form of institutionalised force. Violence is thus, restricted to the sense of destructive harm - hence, a destructive kind of force.⁶ The two terms, force and violence, are often confused. A detachment of policemen against demonstrators represents force. When they use their weapons, it is violence. When a group of university students seize a university building they have used force. When they destroy property or inflict physical injury to persons, they have resorted to violence.

Force is also involved in a threat of violence or counter violence. When violence is actually used, it may constitute only a demonstration of force, a limited and symbolic act to give the demonstration and capability of further action. The thing which is forced must retain and preserve its identity, otherwise it is not forced but destroyed and this destruction involves violence.

4. Nieberg, H.J. Political violence: The Behavioural Proces. p. 11.

5. Jammer, Max, Concepts of Force : A study in the Foundations of Dynamics. p. 37.

6. Walter, E.V. Terror and Resistance : A study of Political violence. p. 40.

Galtung differentiates six important dimensions of violence, by drawing a distinction between;

- (i) Physical and biological violence
- (ii) Negative and positive approach to influence;
- (iii) Whether or not there is an object that is hurt;
- (iv) Whether or not there is a subject(person) who acts
- (v) violence that is intended or unintended; and
- (vi) the two traditional levels of violence, the manifest and the latent. He refers essentially to two types of violence, viz., personal and direct (where there is an actor that commits the violence) and structural or indirect (where there is no such actor). He adds that structural violence is sometimes referred to as social injustice, because it is that violence which is "built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances".⁷

With our theoretical constraints, we may select a few variables for the study of political violence:

(i) Riots:

This would mean any demonstration or clash of a large group of citizens. Violence implies the use of physical force and is generally evinced by the destruction of property, the killing or wounding of people, or the use of riot control equipment. They are distinguished from armed attack events on the basis of whether the event seems

7. Galtung, John, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" Journal of Peace Research, No. 6, 1969, p. 171.

to have been organised, whether it is goal directed, and whether it involves all or most of the participants acting purposefully.

(ii) Armed Attack events:

This would cover acts of violence committed by or involving organised groups with weapons of any kind, when these acts are intended as protests, or acts of revolt or rebellion against a government, its members, policies, or intended policies, etc.

(iii) Political strikes:

Any strike by industrial or service workers, or students, for the purpose of protesting against a government, its leaders, or a governmental policy or action.

(iv) Assassinations :

Any, politically motivated murder or attempted murder of high government official or politician.

Galtung seeks to build an elaborate typology composed of four major groups :

(i) Classical (or direct) violence;

(ii) Repression - deprivation of human right;

(iii) Poverty - deprivation of basic material needs; and

(iv) Alienation - deprivation of higher needs. Each of the

four groups cover the categories included in brackets:

- (i) Classical violence (survival);
- (ii) Poverty (Physiological, Ecological and social);
- (iii) Repression (Freedom, Politics, Legal work); and
- (iv) Alienation (Relation to society, relation to others, relation to self and relation to nature).⁸

Violence, in reference to past actions of those on whom it is inflicted, is punitive. When it discharges persent emotions, it is expressive, and when it is used instrumentally to get things valued (other than power or prestige) it is acquisitive; and when it is used to acquire, extend or retain power and authority, it is political.⁹ Counter violence is defensive and may be deterrent of retaliatory as well. Difference between internal war and violence of the revolutionary dimension is one of scale. Turmoil is unorganised political violence erupting relatively spontaneously and includes violent strike, riots, political clashes and localised rebellions. Conspiracy is organised political violence with limited participation, and includes organised political assassinations, small scale terrorism, mutinies. Internal war is also organised political violence, with wide spread popular participation, and includes large scale terrorism, guerrilla wars and is designed to change constitutions, rulers or policies.¹⁰

8. Galtung John, "The specific contribution of peace Research to the study of the causes of violence: Typologies, "UNESCO paper 1975.

9. Haag, Ernest. Van den. Political violence and civil Disobedience. p. 56.

10. Eckstein, Harry. "Internal war: Problems and Approaches. p.133.

Terror is an ambiguous term, conventionally meaning a type of violent action designed to make people afraid, suggesting extreme apprehension, a psychic state, producing typical patterns of reactive behavior.¹¹ Process of terror compounds three elements: the act or threat of violence, the emotional reaction and the social effects. A violent act is incomplete, because it is directed to an end: the ultimate aim is control and the proximate aim is to instil terror. There may be violence without terror but no terror is possible without violence. Those who use terror do not aim to eliminate the group that is to be terrorised but control it by means of violence and terror. A part of the group is destroyed to instil terror in the whole, but the group as such is not wiped out. Violence destroys group as a group, making structural changes in the society. Only the latter is an irreversable change. System of terror depends upon the position of those who use terror - whether they work against or connive with the dominant power structure. It is designed to over-throw a system of authority, by creating extreme fear through systemic violence. It is a seige of terror or agitational terror.¹² System of terror may also be directed by those who control the institutions of power. If, instead of relying on legitimate and conventional modes of acquiring submission, the rulers

11. Walter, E.V. Ibid. pp. 5-7

12. Walter, E.V. Ibid. p. 7.

initiate a process of ~~terror~~, it may be called a regime of terror or enforcement terror.¹³ The aim of the seige of terror (agitational) is to disrupt the masses and incumbents of power. By showing the weakness of this frame-work the insurgents demonstrate their own strength and the weakness of the authorities. This is the symbolic value of the act of terror.¹⁴ Often, the insurgents resort to terror because they lack the political strength to avail of constitutional procedures and, by their own terror, they attempt to provoke the authorities into repressive measures (enforcement terror) in order to claim that the constitutional machinery is now unavailable.

It is characteristic of acts of terror that they appear entirely unpracticable and arbitrary to the society which suffers them. Political terror is different from other forms of violence - agitation, intimidation and coercion - by virtue of its extreme and ruthlessly destructive methods. These may range from genocide, massacre and political murder and torture at one end of the scale of violence, to physical beatings, harassment and defamation campaigns at the other. There is also a distinction between political terror and political terrorism. Political terror may occur in isolated

13. Eckstein, Harry. op.cit. p. 72.

14. Ibid, p. 77.

acts and also in the form of extreme indiscriminate and the arbitrary mass violence, the kind of insurrectionary outburst that characterised the lynchings and killings at the height of popular terror in the revolutionary France.¹⁵

This is not a systematic terror, is unorganised and is usually impossible to control. Political terrorism is a sustained policy involving the waging of organised terror either on the part of the state, a movement, a faction or by a small group of individuals (i.e. Sikh terrorism). Systematic terrorism invariably entails some organisational structure, however rudimentary, and some kind of theory or ideology of terror. Surprisingly, Che Guevara appears most chary of utilising terrorism, for fear that government repression will cost the insurgents more than they gain.¹⁶

Tactically, provocative terror must be highly discriminate in order to provoke the type of response desired. The target is not so much the victim, who will probably be killed and thus no longer involved in the action. The target is the identification group, the incumbent elite - who will take the desired retaliatory action. The response to be achieved must be one of fear, so that the target will react and will react specifically in a logical and predicted manner.¹⁷

15. Wilkinson, Paul Political Terrorism .(Mac Millan: 1974), p.17.

16. Guevara, Che. On Guerrilla Warfare, Praeger, 1961, p. 59.

17. Thornton, Thomas Perry. "Terror As a Weapon" in Eckstein, Harry, (ed.) Internal War ; Problems and Approaches. pp. 87-88.

Two categories may be given for the systems of terror and this depends on whether these systems work against or for the dominant political structure. The first is oriented toward overthrowing a system of authority either to enable the terrorist to seize control or to clear the way for some other group approved by them. In this type, the terrorists may be recruited externally from foreign enemies of the system under attack, or drawn from indigenous rebels or revolutionaries. Its purpose is to destroy the authority system by creating extreme fear through systematic violence. This type is usually known as the seige of terror. The other category included the systems of authority and are directed by those who already control the power system. Instead of relying on conventional methods of obtaining obedience, the men in power choose to initiate the process of terror. This form is usually known as the regime of terror.

In his very exhaustive study, Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence, E.V. Walter categorises the systems and process of terror (op.cit., p. 8): The specific act or threat of violence may be a form of involuntary behaviour, a deliberate action or an intentional course of action. If the act or threat is not chosen or if it is produced by abnormal psychic processes and can not be withheld, it is involuntary. If the act or threat is willed, it is deliberate violence. If the psychic effect and reactive behaviour are

also willed, then the act or threat is intentional terrorism. The concept "process of terror", includes all three. Although the pattern of calculated terrorism is the one that comes most readily to mind, systems of terror are also established by persons who do not "want" them. Thus, the presence or absence of deliberateness is not crucial to the definition, although it is natural to associate terrorism with deliberate acts of violence and their consequences. Involuntary behaviour, including psychotic acts of violence, must be included. The relative amounts of calculated action and involuntary behaviour may be important in constructing a topology of terror process, but the involuntary event can not be taken as the limiting case.

Friedrich defines Political revolution as a sudden and violent overthrow of an established political order.¹⁸ Kamenka believes that "revolution is a sharp, sudden change in the social location of political power expressing itself in the radical transformation of the process of government, of the official foundations of sovereignty or legitimacy and of the conception of the social order. Such transformations --- could not normally occur without violence, but if they did, they would still though bloodless, be revolution."¹⁹ Tanter

18. Friedrich, Carl J. "An Introductory Note on Revolution" in Friedrich, ed., Revolution. 1967, p. 5.

19. Kamenka, Eugene. "The concept of a political Revolution" in Friedrich. Ibid, p. 124.

and Midlarsky hold that a revolution may be said to exist when a group of insurgents illegally or forcefully challenges the governmental elite for the occupancy of roles in the structure of political authority. A successful revolution occurs when, as a result of the challenges to the governmental elite, insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal roles within the structure of political authority.²⁰ Hannah Arendt holds that "only where change occurs in the sense of a new beginning, where violence is used to constitute an altogether different form of government, to bring about the formation of a new body politic, where the liberation from oppression aims at least by the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolution."²¹ According to Johnson "True revolution is the acceptance of violence in order to cause the system to change when all else has failed, and the very idea of revolution is contingent upon this perception of societal failure".²² According to Amann political regimes exist by virtue of two conditions: their monopoly of means of physical force, and the existence of a widely shared habit of obedience among the masses; and as such, a revolution is "a breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience."²³

20. Tanor, Raymond and Midlarsky, Manus. "A Theory of Revolution", Journal of Peace Research, No. 11, 1957.

21. Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. Viking 1963, p. 28.

22. Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary change, Boston, 1966, p. 12.

23. Amann, Petter, H. "Revolution; A Redefinition", Political Science Quarterly, 77(1962), p. 38.

On the basis of all these definitions, we may identify certain dimensions or components of revolution:

- (i) At a general level - revolution is a form of change.
- (ii) Change is relatively abrupt.
- (iii) This change is striking and far reaching and affects the behaviour patterns of significant segments of the population.
- (iv) Political revolution requires a mass movement .
- (v) Political revolution involves a power transfer, a change in the distribution of political power, a transformation of the ruling class.
- (vi) This power transfer aims at, seeks, or sets the stage for broader social change.
- (vii) Revolutionary change is illegal, extra legal, there are no provisions for it and it is unauthorised.
- (viii) Revolutionary change does not take place except through violence, because change is resisted by the existing authorities. "Non-violent political revolution" is a contradiction in terms.²⁴.

Some scholars understand revolution simply as "the acceptance of violence in order to bring about change,²⁵ or as"

24. Rejai, Mostafa. The comparative strategy of revolutionary strategy, p. 8.

25. Chalmers, Johnson. Revolution and the social system. p. 10.

the ^{wide} range of circumstances ---- from mere threat of force to major civil wars in which illegitimate violence is employed within a country to affect political change".²⁶

Alfred Meyer defines revolution in terms of three distinct processes: the destruction of an ancien regime, a period of chaotic- disorder and the creation of a new order or political system.²⁷

Fellick Gross distinguishes four types of revolutions:²⁸

- (i) A "revolution from below" refers to a mass movement, in part spontaneous, which, developing slowly, eventually explodes in a cataclysmic upheaval leading to far reaching political and social change.
- (ii) A "revolution from above" is a planned, organised, non-spontaneous seizure of political power by a small group of armed men at the very top of the political structure. It entails a rapid takeover of the centers of government authorities, or of the means of violence and of the media of communication and transportation. There is no intention however to introduce social change.

26. Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, Communism and Revolution : The strategic uses of Political violence. p. 4.

27. Alfred G. Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in Soviet political system," Soviet Studies. Vol.17, 1976, p. 275.

28. Fellick, Gross. The Seizure of Political Power in a Century of Revolutions. p. 39.

- (iii) A "combined seizure" contains elements of both revolution from below and revolution from above : in a moment of mass unrest, a group of armed men seizes the political and governmental apparatus.
- (iv) A "palace revolution" refers to a transfer of power, sometimes violent, within the ruling group. The seizure is engineered by a dissident faction within the elite (e. g., family or party), not by an outside group such as the military. There is no intention to initiate political or social change.

James Rosenau identifies three types of civil strife (or revolution).²⁹ "Personnel" conflicts he defines as struggles over current roles in the existing structures with the aspirations to change major policies or the structure of society. Latin American coups d'etat fall into this category. "Authority conflicts are conflicts over the arrangements as well as the occupancy of the roles in the political structure and with the aspirations to change major policies or the structure of society. Colonial struggle for independence or conflicts to replace authoritarian governments with more representative forms furnish examples of such wars. Finally, "structural" strife includes not only conflict over personnel and the structure of political authority, but also over major policies and

29. James N. Rosenau. International Aspect of Civil Strife. p. 634.

the structure of society ^{itself}. Communist insurrections, agrarian revolts, and urban based mass uprisings characterise this third form of civil strife.

A coup d'etat is "an unexpected, forceful substitution of one ruling group for another or at least any sudden successful unconstitutional alteration in government".³⁰ Although unexpected, its occurrence is seldom inconceivable. It is seldom that a successful coup is anticipated at the precise moment of its occurrence. Coups are consummated by the threat of use of force, yet there need not be violence. Violence may ensue after the coup has taken place and may take the form of isolated executions of some traitors. A coup is normally carried out by a small group of individuals whose deliberations and decisions have been secret and whose organization has been conspiratorial. The coup d'etat represents the seizure of a state's symbols of authority and its mechanism for coercion, but this seizure does not in itself necessarily lead to social revolution.³¹

It is interesting how Rejaï explains the coup: "a coup is quite, secret affair. It does not involve the people but is presented to them as a *fait accompli*. The actors are usually public officials of some sort. In fact, one may identify two types of coups, depending on the officials involved".

30. Laden, Carl, and Schmitt, Carl. The Politics of Violence: Revolution in the Modern World. p. 22.

31. Ibid, p. 23

An intra-elite coup (that is a palace revolution) is a coup within the existing ruling in which one faction overthrows another. Khrushchev's ouster by Brezhnev and Kosygin in 1964 is a fair example. An inter-elite coup is a coup from outside the existing ruling group, one in which the military is characteristically involved.³²

In the categories discussed above, it is the "intention" of the actor in actually using or threatening violence that is the basis of criterion and such intentions may be classified in three types.³³ Deterrence from undesired action; punishment for negatively valued acts actually committed; and symbolic demonstration of capacity to act.

Ordinary eruptions of violence on the part of the public ordinarily come out of social cleavages and are not necessarily aimed at affecting the decisions of formal authority. On the other hand, coercive public protest (which is aggregative violence and is public as opposed to clandestine),³⁴ imposes constraints upon authority by presence and actions.

Coercive public protest may assume six primary forms:-

- (i) Procession and public meetings;
- (ii) boycotts, strikes and work stoppage not aimed at the employers;


32. Rejai, Mostafa. The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy. p.20.

33. Parsons, Talcott, "The Place of Force in Social Process", in Harry, Eckstein. Internal War. p. 35.

34. Bayley, David H. "The Pedagogy of Democracy", The American Political Science Review, September, 1962, p. 663.

- (iii) fasts;
- (iv) obstructions;
- (v) courting of arrests; and
- (vi) riots.

These forms are grouped into two main division, legal and illegal. Category of illegal protest divides itself into violent and non-violent.



Here "A", "B" and "C" may be thus explained:

(A) direct action drives out the orderly constitutional responses in democratic states, and its success establishes a precedent for its adoption by other individuals and groups.

(B) At this point, coercive public protest becomes a big rival to the process of peaceful change through democratic government.

(C) Failure of the authority to achieve desired and expected ends leads to the assumption that certain ends justify recourse to undemocratic means.

Another kind of violence is the one used by the authorities to preserve the establishment. Sometimes, violence is directed by those who already control the institutions of power but, instead of relying on conventional and legitimate techniques, they initiate a process of terror which may be called a regime of terror. Because the reactive behaviour is willed, the violent threat or act is intentional terrorism. This intentional terrorism produces fear reactions yielding social effects upon which the stability of the political system depends.

The basis of the stability of the government lies with the satisfaction of the people, and this satisfaction of a dominant class is an immediate source of danger. It is also believed that these persons whom the government is trying to satisfy expect it to prevent any harm to them. Therefore, it is absolutely beyond the grasp of conventional political thinking to believe that a government might exercise violence against the very persons it was trying to satisfy. Thus, it is

difficult for most people to believe in the existence of a government, based on consent, using continual violence as a regular technique on its own people. Because it is believed that order is based on consent, one proceeds to believe further that violent governments (violence= absence of order) are not based on consent.

In this, what is over-looked is that a government based on consent (order) may resort to violence to preserve order, so that the person on whose consent it is based may be satisfied. When voluntary obedience is not forthcoming, then legitimately covered violence is used as a raw technique.

Social violence is an "assault upon an individual or his property solely or primarily because of his membership in a social category".³⁵ According to this definition, a fight between two boys, one Hindu and one Muslim, would not be an instance of social violence in itself. If, however, others (boys and/or adults) joined in on the basis of religious affiliation, it would be a social violence. Obviously, violent events which begin as non-social violence may, during their course, be converted into social violence. Social violence is, in fact, an assault upon the accommodative structure of the society.³⁶ If there is a belief that the law and order

35. Grimshaw, Allen D. "Interpreting collective violence", in the Annals of the American Academy of political Science. Sept. 1970, p.12.

36. Grimshaw, Allen D. "Three views of urban violence", in the American Behavioral Scientist. No. 4 of 1968, p. 2.

agencies are weak or partison (or both) social violence is more likely to occur and spread than if there is a belief that those agencies are strong and non-partison. Grimshaw concludes³⁷ that either the government may assume a passive posture while tacitly approving assault by one group on another, or the government may even take a hands-off position", not favouring any group in a social violence. This latter may occur either because the government is too weak to enforce peace or because it hopes to gain from the mutual weakening of groups engaged in a conflict.

37. Grimshaw, Allen D. "Three views of urban violence", in the American Behavioral Scientist. No. 4 of 1968, p.2.

Chapter III

"SOURCES OF VIOLENCE"

About the general sources of violence some psychological assumptions may be given and, in most theoretical approaches, one or another of these assumptions is implicit.

There are five well known theories of etiology of violence that may be given in this connection:

- (i) The Frustration - Aggression theory, developed by John Dollard.¹
- (ii) Concept of Relative Deprivation by Ted Robert Gurr.²
- (iii) J-Curve principle of Davies.³
- (iv) Feierabend's theory of social change and systemic frustration.⁴
- (v) The theory of modernization causing violence in developing societies, by Huntington.⁵

The psychological assumptions about the generic sources of human aggression may be categorised into three:

- (a) Aggression is instinctive,
- (b) That it is learned,
- (c) That it is an action-response activated by frustration.

1. Dollard, John. Frustration and Aggression (New Haven), 1938; Also Elton D. Mac Neil. "Psychology and Aggression" Journal of conflict Resolution, June 1959, pp. 195-294.

2. Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel (Princeton 1970),

3. James, C. Davies, "Toward a theory of Revolution", American Sociological Review, February, 1962, pp. 5-19.

4. Hugh, Davis Graham, and Ted Robert Gurr. (ed), The History of violence in America, 1967.

The first assumption is based on Neiberg's proposition regarding man's capacity for uncontrolled, bitter and bloody violence.⁶ Instinctual drives are physiological drives that are necessary for life's preservation and continuation. On this basis, it is said that all human actions are directed by a combination of instinctual impulses and, therefore, all human actions contain elements of aggression. This theory assumes that men have, within them, an autonomous source of aggressive impulse, that exhibits "irresistible outbreaks which recur with rhythmical regularity."⁷ Freud believes that man is equipped with instinctive tendencies of destructiveness and aggression that are rooted in the death instinct.⁸ He gives a qualified attribution of the impulse to destructiveness to a death instinct. The self-destruction is prevented by the turning outward of the aggressive impulses. Attacks upon others provide an outlet for the energy of the death instinct.

Lorenz views aggression as a survival enhancing instinct.⁹ When the aggressive instinct cannot be satisfied because of environmental frustrations, self destructiveness increases, with the result that, to prevent self destruction, the individual has

5. Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies . (New Haven 1968), pp. 39-50.

6. Neiberg, H.L. Political violence: The Behavioral Process . (New York: 1961); Also "The Threat of violence and social change, American political science Review", December 1962, p.870.

7. Lorenz, Konard. 'On Aggression . p. XII

8. Brown, J.W. The psychodynamics of Abnormal Behavior . p.156

9. Ibid.

to destroy others through violent actions. Hostile behavior has to be stimulated by an appropriate stimulus which may be some frustrating event.

The other assumption is that aggressive behaviors are learned and used strategically to acquire particular goals. This assumption is reflected in the writings of Chalmers Johnson,¹⁰ who speaks of civil violence as purposive and contributing to the demise of the despicable social system. Talcott Parsons¹¹ fits political violence into the framework of social interaction theory, as a deterrence a symbolic demonstration of capacity to act. It assumes that violence is a learned response, rationally chosen and dispassionately employed in the struggle for scarce values. C. Wright Mills says that the ultimate kind of power is violence, whereas all politics is a struggle for power,¹² thus making violence a technique to acquire power requisite for the achievement of other goals. Johnson speaks of civil violence as "purposive forms of behavior intended to disorient the behavior of others, thereby bringing about the demise of the hated social system".¹³

According to this assumption, people become aggressive when they think that such behavior will help them achieve particular goals. Aggression is at times a stratagem in the

10. Johnson, Chalmers. Revolutionary Change (Boston 1966) pp. 12-13.

11. Parson, Talcott. "Some Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process", in Harry, Eckstein(ed), Internal war : Problems and Approaches. pp. 34-35.

12. Mills. C. Wright. The Power Elite p. 171

competition *between groups* for incompatible goals. Violent anti-Semitic policies of Nazi Germany were carried out for political purposes. Hitler used anti-semitism to achieve an ideological reconciliation of basically contradictory appeals. He satisfied the German middle class that there would be no labour trouble after the elimination of the Jewish agitators, and at the same time could hoodwink the workers that their economic difficulties would be removed when Jewish capitalists were exterminated. Thus, Hitler employed anti-Semitic violence merely for political ends because expression of these hostile attitudes made it possible for the Nazis to say other things that attract people.

The third assumption has been advanced by Dollard,¹⁴ who maintains that the primary source of human capacity for violence appears to be the frustration - aggression mechanism. The anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression. Frustration is an interference with goal directed behavior, an event in which goal directed activity is blocked, slowed up or otherwise interfered with. Whenever goal seeking activity has been initiated but there exists some barrier to satisfaction (such as obstacles, deficiencies, conflicts), a frustrating situation develops. As an event, it is the thwarting circumstances that interfere with goal directed activity. Four kinds of frustrating

14. Dollard John Opp.cit. as in ref. 1

conditions may emerge:¹⁵

- (i) physical barriers,
- (ii) Delays between the initiations and completion of the response sequence,
- (iii) Omission or reduction of a customary reward, and
- (iv) The eliciting of a response tendency that is in-compatible with the on going one.

The basic postulate of the theory, as propounded by Dollard and Berkowitz, is that the occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrarilywise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression. Whether the instigation to aggression leads to open hostility depends upon other factors. Aggressive response occurs by external cues, that is, when the frustrated (and angered) person seizes and attackable object or person that he associates with the source of frustration. In further reformulation of the theory, Pastore found that individuals give less aggressive response to a frustration, if they regard frustration to be reasonable, justifiable and not arbitrary. Usually, they believe that the government imposes, through its compliance sanctions, certain deprivations which are "reasonable". They refrain from aggressive responses because they consider the frustrating actions as proper. There is general agreement that the more maladjusted the individual is,

15. Berkowitz, Leonard. Aggression : A Social Psychological Analysis . Chapter V.

the more likely he is to react aggressively to both arbitrary and non-arbitrary frustrations. Any protest on the part of the individual is clearly an attempt to remove an interference to goal achievement and, therefore, "is indicative of frustration in the individual."¹⁶

The other theory of etiology of violence is derived from the concept of Relative Deprivation (RD) by Ted Robert Gurr. This RD is defined by Gurr as a perceived discrepancy between an individual's perceptions of his value expectations (the value people believe that they are rightfully entitled to) and value position (the level of value actually achieved).¹⁷

The hypothesis of Ted Robert Gurr is that the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and the scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity. The primary causal sequence in political violence is, first, the development of discontent; second, the politicisation of their discontent; and, finally, its actualisation in violent action.

From Aristotle to Lasswell, deprivation has been identified in theoretical analyses as the most general precondition of violence. Aristotle believes that the principal cause of revolution is the desire for economic and political equality

16. Levy, Sheldon. "The Psychology of Political Activity", in the Annals of the American Academy of Political Science. September 1970, p. 85.

17. Gurr, Ted Robert, Opp.cit. p. 24.

on the part of the masses who lack it and the desire of oligarchs for greater inequality than they have — discrepancy in both the instances between what people have relative to what they think is justly theirs.¹⁸ Hoselitz and Wilner also link deprivation with the potential for violence: "Unrelated aspirations produce feelings of disappointment, but unrealised expectations result in feelings of deprivation. Disappointment is generally tolerable. The deprived individual feels impelled to remedy, by whatever means are available, the material and psychic frustrations produced in him. Whereas disappointment may breed the needs of incipient revolution, deprivation serves as a catalyst for revolutionary action."¹⁹ Lasswell and Kaplan believe that a political instability is the result of the discrepancy between expectations and "the degree of realization of value for the masses. It is a low degree of realisation - disparity between value position and value demanded and expected."²⁰

In the J-curve principle, Davies²¹ attributes violence to the frustration which results from a short term decline in achievement following long term increase that generated expectations about continuing increase. The Davies theory of revolution is that "revolutions are most likely to occur

18. Weldon, J.E.C. The Politics of Aristotle . p. 338.

19. Hoselitz, Perl, and Wilner, Ann. "Economic Development, Political Strategies and American Aid," in Morton Kaplan's The Revolution in world politics, p. 363.

20. Lasswell, Harold, and Kaplan, Morton. Power and Society. p.264.

21. Davies, James. C. Opp.cit.

when a prolonged period of objective economic and social development is followed by short period of sharp reversal."²² Soule is also of the view that change is more responsible than oppression for violence: "when the people are in their most desperate and miserable condition, they are often least inclined to revolt, for than they are helpless. Only after their position is somewhat improved and then have sensed the possibility of change, do they revolt effectively against oppression and injustice. What touches off insurrection is hope, not lack of it, rising confidence not bleak suffering."²³ This implies that the scope for violence increases when economic expectations, resulting from economic improvement are blocked by economic adversity and the inability of the socio-political system to take remedial action. The suffering which is undertaken patiently as inevitable, seems unendurable as soon as the idea of escaping from it is conceived. Men whose economic lot is improving aspire for greater political participation, and vice versa, failing which they become more susceptible to violence.

Galtung proposes that any aggression, even crime, rebellion and war, is caused by "rank disequilibria", that is, a lack of consistence in the rankings of individuals, groups or nations on whatever value hierarchies are relevant to them.²⁴ It means value expectations of a group for higher

22. Ibid p.6.

23. Soule, George. The Coming American Revolution. p. 20.

24. Galtung, John. "A Structural Theory of Aggression", Journal of Peace Research. No.2 of 1964, p. 95.

status are increased in case of an increase in its share of welfare values. If a group has attained a high rank in the social distribution of one value, it will expect a corresponding rank on other values also. If its status attributes are differently ranked on the social hierarchy, the group will be dissatisfied and prone to violence.

Davies holds²⁵ that, contrary to Marxian principles or the assumptions of Alexis de Tocqueville, revolutions do not occur during periods of prolonged or worsening situations of social deprivation. On the contrary, revolutions are perpetrated during periods of relative prosperity and improvement. Thus, Davies postulates a J-curve of socio-economic development and projects revolution/violence at that point of the curve where discrepancy between achievement and expectations is intolerable.

Feierabend's theory of social change and systematic frustration²⁶ develops the hypothesis of systemic frustration, which is applicable to any analysis of aggregate, violent political behaviour within social systems. Systemic frustration is defined as one collectively experienced within society

25. Davies, James. C. Opp.cit.

26. In Graham & Gurr, Opp.cit., pp. 635-8.

particularly with reference to three situations :-

- (a) due to interference in the attainment and maintenance of social goals, aspirations and values;*
- (b) due to similar simultaneous experience by members of a social aggregate; and*
- (c) due to strain produced within the structures and processes of a social system.*

According to this theory, violent political behaviour is instigated by systemic frustration and systemic frustration is instigated from specific characteristic of social change. Systemic frustration is a function of discrepancy between present social aspiration and expectations on the one hand, and social achievements on the other. Present estimates (i.e. expectations of future frustrations or satisfactions) determine the level of present frustration or satisfaction. Uncertainty in social expectations (i.e. whether the future will bring disaster or salvation) increases the sense of systemic frustration.

On the basis of the above hypothesis, Clington Fink has given sociological, semanticist and socio-psychological approaches to social conflict.²⁷

27. Fink, Clington F. "Difficulties in the theory of conflict", Journal of conflict Resolution, December, 1968, p. 428.

	Socio- Psychological	Sociological	Semanticist
1. Basis or starting point of conflict	Tensions within the individual which result from accumulated frustration and can be relieved only through aggression; essentially non-rational.	Incompatibility between the goal aims or values of the opposing systems (individuals or groups); often rational.	Verbal or conceptual misunderstanding between the parties; non-rational; goal or value incompatibility does not exist.
2. Orientation towards the opponent.	Prejudice, hostility, hatred, stereo-types	Hatred and Hostility does not necessarily present.	Hatred and Hostility present.
3. Modes of action	Scaregoating, aggression, fighting, quarrelling, violence; efforts to change attitudes or motives.	Schism, secession, civil war, sect formation, splinter parties, resistance movements, revolutions, strategic considerations.	Breakdown in communication efforts at semantic clarification.

A similar model is proposed by Tad Robert Gurr,²⁸ and according to this, the potential for collective violence is in direct proportion to the intensity and scope of relative deprivation, which, in turn, determines the normative and utilitarian justification for violence. Normative justifications for violence are also determined by the historical magnitude and the success of earlier realises in alleviating the social deprivations.

28. Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel . p. 326.

Utilitarian justifications are also determined by new, symbolic appeals prescribing violence as an effective value opportunity for increasing value positions. These symbolic appeals offer plausible explanations of the sources of social denigrations, identifying targets for violence, and provide symbols of group identification. Most such appeals have both utilitarian and effective content. Successful violence increases the likelihood of its recurrence, which is even more increased in the presence of extra-punitiveness of socialisation practices in a society. Under these socio-historical variables, if there is inadequate regime response, the regime legitimacy comes into question, increasing the potential for violence.

There are three social structure situations which might produce systematic frustration : one is conceived by James Davies and two by Teierabend. Davies presumes a society which may have enjoyed an all along improvement in socio-economic-political fields and expecting conditions to further improve, but suddenly there may be a sharp reversal in these trends. Social discontent and turmoil to be felt by such a society is demonstrated by Davies in the form of "J-Curve" in a graphic fashion. Teierabend, however, conceives of two more J-Curves.²⁹

29. Teierabend, Leo & Rosalind, "The comparative study of Revolution and violence", in Comparative Politics, (April 1973), p. 406-407.

Gap between expectations and achievement equals systemic frustration.





Figure 1 conceives of a country experiencing a meagre level of social achievement and a low level of socio-economic-political conditions for sometime and with no hopes for improvement. There may be a sudden and unexpected improvement and this social shock is sure to augment unrealistic expectations which will, undoubtedly, be disappointed giving rise to discontent and systematic frustration. Figure 2 depicts a society in a state of flux and disarray, changing rapidly in various directions, and with an inconsistent and haphazard performance. Uncertainty of social security will result in social anxiety, a situation characteristic of systemic frustration.

In the other theory of etiology of violence, Samuel Huntington³⁰ argues that the cause of violence in the developing societies are to be found in the "Lag" between the development of viable political institution and the processes of social and economic change.

Violence is mostly a product of societal deprivation, or retarded emotional development due to social handicaps, a product of the environment of the establishment. Social modernization leads to centralisation of power and profit, creating inequalities of standards and expectations, and making life of some men more "nasty, brutish, and short". Under this modernization process a nation as such does not develop but

30. Huntington, Samuel P. Political order in changing Societies, pp. 39-50.

only certain sections ~~and~~ groups, creating islands of prosperity in oceans of development. This process is actually maldevelopment, creating social tensions and increasing the scope for violence. Under maldevelopment violence lies not so much in the use of the gun but in what the gun protects. Since the gun protects social exploitation and perpetuates deprivation, violence in the developing countries becomes the only means available to remove the "ought and is dichotomy". Violence is thus, a product of the system that a developing society upholds.

This process is almost natural for the developing societies. The ruling elite in such societies have to satisfy the expectations of modernization besides keeping themselves in power, but their limited resources create a gap between these expectations and requisite results. In an attempt to hoodwink the masses so that they may forget this gap, political participation is widely expanded and cultural - racial - communal - caste cleavages are politicised. This leads to an inflation of demands by groups who support the government. A conflict sets in between the incumbents and the aspirants. In such circumstances, Zolberg believes that power aspirants demand power not as an intrinsic value but as a value capacity. It may

be pointed out that, in India also, the scarcity of resources was most acutely felt after independence, not because there was greater poverty than had been fifty years before, but because popular aspirations had expanded much more rapidly than society's ability to fulfil public demands.

Huntington accepts the three tier paradigm of societies as developed by the structuralist-functionalists (i.e. traditional, transitional and modern). Huntington argues that while the first and the last are less prone to violence and instability, the transitional societies are the most prone. According to him, revolutionary upheavals, military coups, insurrections, guerrilla warfare, assassinations etc. are a common feature of transitional societies. Huntington rejects the "poverty thesis" that there is an irrefutable relationship between violence and economic backwardness.

Huntington postulates that it is not poverty and backwardness but desire to get rich and modernised that breeds instability and violence: "if poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor but because they are trying to be rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor, and stable. It is precisely devolution of modernisation throughout the world which increases the prevalence of violence around the world.

Causes of violence lay with the modernization rather than with the backwardness".³¹

Huntington asserts that within modernizing countries, violence, unrest and extremism are found in the wealthier parts of the country rather than in poorer sections, (for India, we may give the relevant examples from the case of Punjab). Some degree of economic growth is, thus, necessary to make instability possible: "the poverty thesis falls down because the people who are really poor are too poor for politics and too poor for protest. They are indifferent, apathetic, and lack exposure to the media and other stimuli which arouse their aspirations in such manner as to galvanise them into political activity. Those who are concerned about the immediate goal of the next meal are not apt to worry about the grand transformation of society. Just as social mobilisation is necessary to provide the motive for instability so also some measure of economic development is necessary to provide the means for instability".³²

In this way, social mobilization is much more destabilising than economic development. Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, expose the traditional man to new forms of life and new possibilities of satisfaction. These break the attitudinal barriers of the

31. Huntington, Samuel P. Opp.cit, p. 41.

32. Ibid, p. 52-3

traditional culture and promote new levels of aspirations. However, the capacity of a traditional society to satisfy these aspirations increases much more slowly. Consequently, a gap or a "lag" develops between aspirations and expectations. This lag generates social dissatisfaction which leads to demands on government and a greater participation to enforce these demands. Lack of adequate political institutions make it difficult for the demands to be moderated or to be expressed through legitimate channels. Hence, the sharp increase in political participation leads to political instability and violence.

The structural-functionalist - behavioralist thinkers like Lucian Pye,³³ Edward Shils³⁴, Clifford Geertz,³⁵ and James Coleman³⁶ have called attention to the prevalence of violence in the "transitional societies". Their main argument is that the basic cause of internal violence is the lack of political integration due to ethnic, regional, linguistic or communal splits and divisions. Since change produces more insecurity, there must be a quantitative increase in the degree of hostility within society.

33. Pye, Lucian. Aspects of Political Development .

34. Shils, Edward. Political Development in the New States .

35. Geertz, Clifford. Old Societies and New States : The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa .

36. Coleman, James. The politics of the Developing Areas .

Bienen has given an interesting explanation of this phenomenon: "as people are being changed from traditional into moderns ----- their sensitivity to being changed is a source of violence in traditional societies ----- since change produces more insecurity, there must be a quantitative increase in the degree of aggression and hostility within society ----- the highest and lowest points of modernity continuum will tend to produce maximum stability in the political order, whereas a medium position on the continuum will produce maximum instability ----- there is a connection between rates of change, the breaking up of traditional societies and increased violence."³⁷

It is necessary to emphasise that violence is not necessarily the bi-product of developmental process, per se. The fact is that it is not development but the disequilibrium in development, or what may be better described as maldevelopment, that results in tensions, conflicts and violence. The developmental task, with social justice and removal of poverty, becomes difficult in a situation of scarce resources or less than optimal tapping of resources, coupled with low production, inadequate or obsolete technology but ever increase in demands by steadily growing population which has become newly

37. Bienen, Henry. Violence and Social change (Chicago : 1968), pp. 48, 51 & 52.

conscious of its political rights. In an unequal society, fragmented by tribal, caste, class, communal or other cleavages, the maldevelopment process resulting in unequal opportunities in the competition for jobs, educational and social services facilities etc, aggravate group and class conflict on the one hand, and accentuate individual frustration on the other.

The link between economic inequality and political violence has been emphasised by political thinkers of all the ages: "Aristotle considered inequality to be the universal and chief cause of revolutions, contending in The Politics that inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superiors. Centuries later Madison in The Federalist - No. 10, characterised inequality in the distribution of property as the most common and durable source of political friction. Still later, Engels argued that political violence results when political structures are not synchronised with socio-economic conditions."³⁸ While testing these hypothesis in diverse and varied social settings, the above authors state that "we have brought theoretical agreement that economic inequality begets political violence."³⁹

38. Sigelman, Lee and Simpson, "iles. "Cross-National Test of the Linkage Between Economic Inequality and Political Violence", The Journal of conflict Resolution, March, 1977, pp. 105-128.

39. Ibid, p. 103.

Economic interests - disputes get politicised, resulting in tensions, conflicts and violence. Inter-group disputes acquire the form of inter ethnic, inter-communal, inter-caste, inter-lingual and inter-cultural conflicts.

We may conclude that shortcomings in the performance of the political-economic system together with acute poverty, chronic inequality and elite repression constitute major causes of political violence in the developing countries of the Third World.

CHAPTER - IV

"NATURE OF VIOLENCE"

It would be appropriate that, in asserting the nature of violence, we do not have to give an authoritative statement of what violence is, but what it involves. This would provide a basis for further assessment.

Hannah Arendt points out the consequences when the notions drawn from areas of productivity invade the understanding of control and authority.

An element of violence is inevitably inherent in all activities of making, fabricating, and producing, that is, in all activities by which men confront nature directly, as distinguished from those activities, like action and speech, which are primarily directed toward human being. This building of the human artifice always involves some violence done to nature - we must kill a tree in order to have lumber, and we must violate this martial in order to build a table.¹

Norms about nature of violence depend upon how we deal with aggressive impulses and how we deal with it depends upon our cultural traditions of civil peace or conflict. If social deprivation is shared, the responsibility for it is also shared and political targets do not become the immediate casualty.

1. Hannah, Arendt. "What was Authority"? in Authority. ed. by C.J. Friedrich. Cambridge, Mass, 1958, p. 91.

But, in cases of specific deprivation, discontent deflects responsibility on the political targets, and scope for violence increases.² Intensely discontented populations become, susceptible to beliefs justifying the righteousness of violence, calculating about the gains (real or imaginary) they can achieve through violence. When prejudice or hostility has developed, the report of any additional grievance activities norms justifying violence.³ These hostile attitudes along lines of political, religious, or class cleavages originate in a variety of ways: from a history of group conflict, from threatening demands of a subordinate group for additional privileges or simply from increased contacts between people belonging to different ideational system and life styles.⁴ Once the hostile attitudes have developed, impulse to violent action is determined by beliefs about the sources of deprivation and about the normative utilitarian and socio-cultural justifiability of violent action directed against the source of deprivation.

According to Wolfgang, "we find no psychological evidence of any spontaneous stimuli for fighting arising within the body of a normal organism. This lack of evidence leads to an important consideration: the chain of causation of overt

2. Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel . p. 193.

3. Leonard, Berkowitz discusses this in detail in chapter VI of Aggression: A Social Psychological Analysis.

4. Gurr, Ted Robert. opp cit, p. 197.

aggression traces back to the outside of the organism, and although there may be individual differences in the reactivity to external stimuli evoking aggression, these inner characteristics do not, by themselves explain aggressive behavior.⁵

Violence is not a necessary manifestation of human nature. Neither it is a necessary consequence of the existence of political society. It is merely a specific response to specific social conditions. Motivation for violence may not necessarily be instinctive because only activity to reach the goal is instinctual, not the goal itself. Therefore, it is the capacity for violence, not the need, which appears to be biologically inherent in men. The need for violence depends on how badly socially derived expectations are violated.⁶ In this way, discontent becomes the need for violence, when people believe that violence against the source of discontent is justified in a normative sense.

The normal response of the majority in any society is obedience to authority, whether it is from habit, fear, apathy, self interest or identification with its goals. Violence is a real and serious challenge to the norm of this conforming behavior and first has to defy a ground on which such norms rest. Justification for violence has to be within the framework

5. Wolfgang, E. Marvin. "A preface to violence", in The Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, March 1966

6. Ibid p. 317.

of the basic values shared in a society. If, in a political struggle, it seems that, to secure redress, a real threat to the stability of an apathetic society is needed, violence is more likely to be adopted even at the risk of repression.

Violence is not erratic and meaningless, but is a natural form of political behavior.⁷ Individuals resort to violence, not because they are incapable of other modes of behavior, but because they consciously believe that their behavior is the most rational way of achieving particular goals. Violence is often employed by unreasonable men, but never without reason. When people believe that conditions could be changed but are not, violence becomes a natural human emotion. This emotionalism is not inconsistent with the capacity to rationally determine any action or specifically select specific mode for achieving the desired goals. Violence, in fact, may be looked upon as society's early warning system, revealing deep rooted conflicts gathering strength beneath the surface of social relations. It is a form of communication, a method of getting a message across that the government is not getting the consensus of its citizens on matters which touch them deeply. It is an indication that pressure had been building up against the chain of social relationship.

7. Næiberg, H.L. "Political Violence: The Behavioral Process," p.81

Two rational aspects may be given for violence: Its actual use and its threatened or potential use. These two aspects can not be separated. In the absence of capability of the actual use, the threat of violence will have little effect in inducing a willingness to bargain politically. Actually, threat of violence intends not the provocation of actual violence but an accommodation of interests. Similarly, the actual use of violence intends to demonstrate the will and capability of action, to establish some credibility of future threats.⁸

In the social bargaining spectrum, violence is a technique in the sense, that, as a potential threat, it changes the bargaining equation. In a sense, as Neiberg says, it is the ultimate test of viability of values and customary behavior.⁹ Violence has become a normal and accepted method of political bargaining, change and control. Any social system may erupt into violence if an important social group finds its vital interests denied when pursued through conventional legal channels. The use of violence is a continuation of bargaining begun by other means. Neiberg has aptly described this process in these words: "All the attenuated politically socialised forms of indirect power are brushed aside. The threat of force becomes action,

8. Neiberg, H.L. "The threat of violence and social change," American Political Science Review, December 1962, p. 865.

9. Neiberg, H.L. Political violence: The Behavioral Process. p. 9.

inching from forms of demonstration and continued bargaining into a direct test of relative power by actual mutual attack and defence. Bargaining, inducement, coercion and possible accommodation now hang upon tactical and strategic weakness and advantage, the shifting conditions of maneuver and battle. Yet, short of the total collapse or destruction of the means of struggle on one side, the element of bargaining, the continuous assessment of capabilities, risks and costs is not suspended in the movement towards eventual accommodation. Power in the sense of raw violence, defence and counter violence is always in the process of measurement, which at some point of respite becomes the provisional basis for political settlement.¹⁰

Violence is not political pathology but a particular mode of political participation, chosen by those who feel that the system can, and must be, pushed into action. It represents bargaining for articulate community values, denied to a section of the community. It is also clear that violence is increasingly becoming political, programmed, standardised in terms of techniques and becoming closely correlated with the organisational capacities of groups which sponsor it.

In this sense, we may say that violence has become a conventional form of political participation. Potential for violence is reduced if there are freedoms to redress grievances and

10. Ibid, p.12.

if legal channels are available to remove discontent because riots are the language of those to whom no one listens. In stable conditions, social changes are carried through legal channels. But in unstable conditions, bargaining for social values is sometimes intensified to the point of violence, because legitimacy of the political system will always remain questionable to those to whom resources are not available.

An environment of acute economic deprivation has discouraging effects upon those who appear as having the biggest reasons to revolt against. Violence being a rational technique, there must be some degree of the hope of success before it can be resorted to. An extreme inequality in itself does not appear to promote such hopefulness. The poorest in a society can do little beyond ensuring that they remain above the starvation level. It is only those who have some material resources to spare, but are dissatisfied with what they have, that are more likely to risk an open defiance of the authority, which might lead to violence.

It is, thus, claimed that the use of violence is to be viewed as a reflection of basic values that stand apart from the dominant, central or parent culture.

In their assessment of the impact of industrialization on social stability, Clark Kerr etc. point out: " The discontent

of workers, reflected in the disruptive forms of protest, tends to be greatest in the early stages of industrialization and tends to decline as workers become accustomed to industrialization. The partially committed industrial worker, with strong ties to the extended family and village, unaccustomed to urban life and to the discipline and ways of the factory, is more likely to reflect upon revolt against industrial life than the seasoned worker, more familiar with the ways of the factory, more understanding of the reasons for the web of factory rules, more reconciled to factory life. The workers, in the process of the early stages of industrialization, is more prone to prolonged and sporadic withdrawal from industrial work, wildcat stoppages, naked violence, and destruction of machines and property".¹¹

This would suggest that violence should increase across societies from low to middle ranges of economic development but then decline at the highest levels— thereby reflecting the stabilizing effect of post industrial affluence.

On the other hand, Sorokin suggests that violence is a phenomenon of societies with rapid transformation: "The hypothesis of transition accounts for these tidal waves of disturbance. It means that, other conditions being equal, during the periods when existing culture, or the system of social relationships, or both, undergo a rapid transformation, the

11. Kerr, Clark et. al., Industrialism and Industrial Man, (Mass: 1960) p.30.

internal disturbances in the respective societies increase. The main and indispensable condition for an eruption of internal disturbances is that the social system or cultural system or both be unsettled. This seems to fit the facts much better than most of the popular theories—that ascribe internal disturbances either to growing poverty and the hard material conditions, or, on the contrary, to material progress."¹²

Similar to the above observation of Sorokin, are the points made by Mancur Olson that rapid economic change, whether upswing or downswing, frequently produces severe social instability, conflict and the potential for revolution: contrary to the common notion that economic growth promotes political stability and even stable democracy, it produces severe social dislocations, loosening the caste and class ties that bind men to the existing social order; those separated in the historical process of rapid economic growth from their villages and extended families are not apt to acquire comparable social connections in the city and thus are prone to join destabilizing mass movements.¹³ Further more, economic growth frequently increases the number of social 'losers', since although the national product increases, it often becomes concentrated in fewer hands so that large segments of society experience a net loss in economic well-being.

12. Sorokin, Pitrim A. Social and Cultural Dynamics, (Boston; 1957) p. 602.

13. Olson, Mancur. "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," Journal of Economic History, December 1963, pp 529-552.

Likewise, a rapid decrease in the level of economic development of a society can produce similar destabilizing effects. This is true because such a decrease usually involves changes in the relative economic positions of large numbers of people, thus setting up contradictions between the structure of economic power and the distribution of social and political power. Kornhauser viewed major discontinuities in the social process, as indexed by the rates, scope and mode of social change, as the principal cause of mass society and political violence. The social disruption that accompanies rapid urbanization and industrialization is destabilizing because it uproots and atomizes large numbers of people by vitiating or entirely destroying intermediate organizations and institutions that align them with the large society.¹⁴

According to Huntington, socio-economic changes necessarily disrupt traditional, social and political groupings and undermine loyalty to traditional authorities. A broader form of social organisation is replaced by a narrower one and the hostilities intensified. Modernization tends to produce alienation, anomie, normlessness generated by the conflict of old values and new. It means that groups become increasingly aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups. Alongwith group consciousness, group prejudice also develops when there is intensive contact

14. Kornhauser, William. The Politics of Mass Society. (New York: 1959) p. 37.

between different groups and alongwith group prejudice, comes group conflict. Ethnic or religious groups which had lived peacefully side by side in traditional societies become aroused to violent conflict. As a result of the interaction, the tensions and inequalities are generated by social and economic modernization.¹⁵

Huntington also suggests that it is not the absence of modernization but efforts to achieve it which produce political disorders, conflicts, and violence: "If poor countries appear to be unstable, it is not because they are poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely traditional society would be ignorant, poor and stable."¹⁶

This hypothesis also holds for variations within countries. In modernizing countries violence, unrest, and extremism are more often found in the wealthier parts of the country than in the poorer sections. In analysing the Indian situation, Hoselitz and Weiner found that the correlation between political stability and economic development is poor or even negative.¹⁷

Modernization promotes new levels of aspirations and wants, but the ability of a transitional society to satisfy these new aspirations increases much more slowly than the

15. Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. p. 39.

16. Ibid p. 41.

17. Hoselitz, Bert F., and Myron Weiner, "Economic development and political stability in India," Dissent, spring 1961, n. 173.

aspirations themselves. Consequently a gap develops between aspiration and expectations, want formation and want satisfaction: Political instability in modernizing countries is in large part a function of the gap between aspiration and expectations produced by the escalation of aspirations which particularly occurs in the early phases of modernization."¹⁸

This implies that the scope for violence increases when economic expectations, resulting from economic improvement, are thwarted by economic adversity and inability of the socio-political system to take remedial action. The suffering which is undertaken patiently as inevitable seems unbearable as soon as the idea of escaping from it is conceived. Men whose economic lot is improving aspire for greater political participation, and vice-versa failing which they become more susceptible to violence. Galtung proposes that any aggression, even crime, rebellion or war, is caused by "rank disequilibria," that is a lack of consistence in the ranking of individuals, groups or Nations, on whatever value hierarchies are relevant to them.¹⁹ It means value expectations of a group for higher status are increased in case of an increase in its share of welfare values. If a group has attained a high rank in a social distribution of one value, it will expect a corresponding rank on other values also. If its status attributes are differently ranked on the

18. Huntington. Opp. cit p.56.

19. Galtung, John. "A structural theory of Aggression," Journal of Peace Research, No.2 of 1964, p.95.

social hierarchy, the group will be dissatisfied and prone to violence.

The above analysis suggests that intensely discontented men are disposed to aggression. Here, the assertion is that participants in violence have utilitarian motives: They believe that they have a chance of relieving some of their discontent through violence. This perception of utility is not always rational in the sense of being based on accurate calculations about the effects of alternative forces of action. Men are said to have utilitarian motives about political violence to the extent that they believe violent action will improve overall value positions. Men make, more or less, explicit calculations about the prospective benefits *viz a viz* prospective costs of violence as a tactic. Such calculations are likely to be more explicit among leaders, more implicit among potential followers—the greater they believe the potential gains to be, the more justifiable violence is likely to appear to them.

The utilitarian functions attributed to violence may differ dimensionally. Violence may be regarded as a direct tactic of value enhancement, but there may be a difference of emphasis between the demonstrative threats of violence and the actual use of violence. In the utilitarian sense, the most direct use of violence is to seize a desired object. Less direct use of violence includes protests, strikes, and anti-government riots which are designed to force the government to

change undesirable policies. In the former kinds of events the threat of violence is more potent than the actuality; in the latter, violence itself is required. An indirect use of violence may symbolically demonstrate the demands of those who use it and their capacity to disrupt society if their demands are not satisfied. "This kind of tactical use and threatened use of political violence is characteristic of participants and leaders perceive a potential form alleviating deprivation within the existing political system. But if dissidents believe that their objectives can be obtained only by transforming the system, they are likely to use terroristic tactics to publicise their existence and objectives, and to widen popular support by providing symbolic models for aggression and by demonstrating the regime's incapacity to provide protection, hoping ultimately to overthrow it."²⁰ Kropotkin, an ardent advocate of terrorism, emphasised the conversion effect of such acts. "through the terrorist deeds which attract general attention, the new idea insinuates itself into people's heads and makes converts. Such an act does more propagandising in a few days than do thousands of pamphlets."²¹

Revolutionary appeals persuade men that political violence can provide value gains equal to or greater than its costs in risk and guilt. Gurr emphasises that revolutionary

20. Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel, p. 212.

(ed.)

21. Kropotkin, Pierre, quoted in Eckstein, Harry, Internal war : Problems and Approaches, p. 83.

appeals "provide justification for new or intensified value expectations, and enhance men's value capabilities by specifying appropriate kinds of actions (value opportunities) which make it possible to attain those value expectations."²²

The factor which determines the perceived utility of violence is people's previous success in attaining their ends by such means. People who obtain their demands through aggression are likely to use it as a tactic in the future. Rewards for aggression establish persistent aggressive habits. Similarly, if men believe that violence by their predecessors succeeded, they will be disposed to use it themselves in similar circumstances. This may explain the recurrence of more than hundred coup d' etat in Latin American countries in the first seventy five years of the 20th century.

Similarly, violence may attain a utilitarian perspective by the demonstration effect of other groups' successful use or threat of violence. People who observe others gain satisfaction through aggression are likely to emulate them. Such effect would be even greater if the perceiving group seize substantial comparability between its status and that of the group it might emulate.

22. Gurr, Ted Robert Opp.cit. p. 216.

Much of the utilitarian content of violence involves some sort of scapegoating. People become easily susceptible to beliefs that identify ethnic, religious, political or tribal minorities as sources of deprivation, hence as justifiable targets of attack. Violent anti-Jew policies of Nazi Germany were carried out in this fashion. When Hitler was asked whether he thought that the Jew had to be destroyed, he is reported to have said, "no, we should have then to invent him, it is essential to have a tangible enemy not merely an abstract one."²³ Hitler used anti-semitism to achieve an ideological reconciliation of basically contradictory appeals. He satisfied the German middle class that there would be no labour trouble after the elimination of the Jewish agitators, and at the same time could hoodwink the workers that their economic difficulties would be removed when Jewish capitalists were exterminated. Thus, Hitler employed anti-semitic violence primarily for political ends, because expression of these hostile attitudes made it possible for the Nazis to say other things that attract people. Inter-group violence mostly results due to displacement of aggression from other objects. A number of factors influence the effectiveness of beliefs justifying scapegoating. One is the previous association of the out group with hostility, for example as a source of past frustrations or as previous targets of aggression. If men already dislike an outgroup for some reasons, they

23. Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movement. (Harper : 1951), p. 90.

are susceptible to rumours and beliefs that associate their present discontent with a group.²⁴ Also the visibility of out-groups determines their scapegoating. The more visible or different they are, the more readily discontented people learn external and internal cues that associate such groups with their discontent. The more defenceless an outgroup appears to be, the more readily is blame attributed to it and aggression directed against it.²⁵

Violence is political when, "used to control or influence collective policies or the distribution of power".²⁶ It refers to all "collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbents - or its policies."²⁷ It is the effect sought (or achieved) that distinguishes political from non-political violence, not the causes from which either springs. Violence is political, if it results (or is expected to result) in a change in the constitution, rulers or policies within a political order.²⁸ Political violence is a mode of participation by those who believe that the political system can, and must be, hurried or pushed into action. In short, we can say that political violence means an attempt to bring changes in the political order through violence.

24. Berkowitz, Leonard. Aggression : A social Psychological Analysis. pp. 152-160.

25. Walter, Richard, "Implications of laboratory studies of Aggression for the control and Regulation of violence". Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. March 1966, pp. 69-70.

26. Haag, Ernest van den Political Violence and Civil Disobedience p. 80.

27. Guur, Ted Robert. Opp.cit. p. 4.

28. Eckstein, Harry On the Etiology of Internal Wars. p. 133.

Some factors can be formulated that determine the political nature of violence:

- (i) Object of victim (toward whom the behaviour is directed),
- (ii) Implementation (the way the act is carried out),
- (iii) Motivation (impulsive or calculated),
- (iv) Association (Lone act or conspiratorial group),
- (v) Organization of the activity (Professional assassins or individuals induced by pressure of others),
- (vi) Culture pattern (Perception of normative pattern of political behavior), and
- (vii) Political impact and effects.

With these variables, political violence would mean, "acts of disruption, destruction, injury, whose purpose, choice of targets, or victims surrounding circumstances, implementation and/or effects have political significance which tend to modify the behavior of others in a bargaining position that has consequences for the social system."²⁹ The purpose of political violence may be categorised by reference to whether it is "directed towards securing changes in the operation of the law or policy of the government, the law or policy itself, the change of government, an alteration of the political system or a transformation of the society."³⁰

29. Neiberg H.L. Political Violence : The Behavioral Process . p. 13.

30. Macfarlane, Laslie. Political Disobedience . p. 37.

*At a general level of analysis, political violence is a homogeneous universe within which forms of violence are as follows:*³¹

- 1. Turmoil : Relatively spontaneous, unorganised political violence with substantial popular participation, including violent political strikes, riots, political clashes, and localised rebellions.*
- 2. Conspiracy : Highly organised political violence with limited participation, including organised political assassinations, small-scale terrorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, coup d' etat, and mutinies.*
- 3. Internal War : Highly organised political violence with wide spread popular participation, designed to overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied by extensive violence, including large-scale terrorism and guerrilla wars, civil wars, & revolutions.*

The quality which is common to all the above forms and is a characteristic of its political nature, is that violence is used to acquire, extend or retain power or authority.

The legitimacy of the political system remains questionable to social groups— if their interests are not accommodated

31. Gurr, Ted Robert. Opp cit p. 11.

and compromised. Such groups may resort to force and violence for making demands upon the political system. Reception of deprivation induces discontent which is the instigating condition for violence. Whatever the theoretical notions about the causes of violence (such as frustration, alienation, drive—goal conflicts, exigency, strain etc.) the linkage between deprivation and discontent is implicit or explicit in all of them.

The casual sequence in political violence is, first, the absence of accommodation of interests of some groups; second, the development of discontent; third, the politicisation of that discontent; fourth, its actualisation in violent action against political object and actors. There may be a belief that violence has utility in obtaining scarce values, and this may, in itself, become a source of violence. But generally, within political system, this feeling is more likely to provide only a secondary, but rationalising, motivation and not the primary cause. Whereas, wide spread discontent provides a general impetus to political violence. Politicised discontent is "a necessary condition for the resort to violence of politics,"³² if normative and utilitarian attitudes focus that potential.

The mere existence of discontent alone is not enough to justify violence. Violence, resulting from deprivation—

32. Gurr, Ted Robert. Opp cit p. 14.

discontent, becomes politicised when people are made aware of deprivation. Discontented people can act aggressively only when they become aware of the supposed source of frustration, or someone or something with which they associate frustration. Schwartz examines the functions of revolutionary appeals in this context.³³ The target of such appeals are passively alienated people who perceive threat, futility and loss in their political environment and as a consequence harbour feelings of tension and rage. Discontented people are inherently disposed to doctrinal justifications of aggressive action.

Political violence aims at creating maximum inconvenience to social order. This is a way of influence for those who are otherwise weak in other more positive aspects of social bargaining because "by causing reallocation of the resources of the society into the essentially negative goal of internal security, the opposition is in a position to defeat or cripple the positive goals whose accomplishment might legitimise and strengthen governmental authority."³⁴

If a policy is supported by the majority in a democracy, necessary policy changes can be brought about at the required time. Similarly, if a democratic government is opposed by the majority, it can be easily and legally ousted from its office. But if a minority believes a change of policy to be necessary, and important enough to impose it on the majority, either

33. Schwartz, David C. "A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior, in James C. Davies, *When Men Rebel and Why*. p.85.

34. Neiberg, H. L. *Opp cit* p. 127.

without persuading the latter or after despairing of the attempts to persuade, then violence is not only needed but even justifiable to the minority. Obviously, violence is required when its aims are not supported by the majority and, therefore, "the cost of violence against a democratic government includes a cost of forcefully imposing policies not approved or opposed by the majority." ³⁵

We have to accept it that in a democracy the majority remains unpersuaded and has to be coerced. If some law or policy has to be changed, it can be brought about only by attempts to replace or over-throw the government of the majority. Without this assumption, there can not be any case for violence in a democracy.

35. Haag, Ernest Van den, Op cit p. 76

C O N C L U S I O N

It may be submitted that resort to violence does not occur without reason. Violence is a natural and logical form of political behaviour. Men resort to violence, not because they are incapable of other modes of behaviour, but because they consciously believe that this particular behaviour is the most rational way of achieving particular goals quickly. Any political system may erupt into violence if an important social group finds its vital interests denied when pursued through conventional legal channels. It is because of this reason that violence has become a normal and accepted method of political bargaining, change and control.

Violence is a technique for social bargaining, in the sense that, as a potential threat, it changes, in fact, the bargaining equation. Threat of violence, at the time of social bargaining, intends not the provocation of actual violence as such, but the accommodation of interests. It represents bargaining for articulate community values denied to a section of the community and, thus, becomes a particular mode of political participation for those who feel that the system can, and must, be pushed into action. In unstable social conditions, bargaining for scarce social values is sometimes intensified to the point of violence, because legitimacy of the political system remains questionable to those to whom resources

are not available. Such discontented persons believe that violence against political system or its actors is justified in a normative sense, and potentially useful in enhancing their prospects for scarce social values. Political system and its actors are naturally held responsible, by errors of commission or omission, for depriving conditions and, therefore, focus against themselves the potential for political violence.

Deprivation, and resultant discontent, of values has always been identified, in theoretical analyses, as the most general precondition for violence. If a discrepancy exists between what they have relative to what they think is justly theirs, they feel deprived and discontented and become more prone to resort to violence to redress their deprivation. The deprived individual feels impelled to remedy, by whatever means are available, the material and psychic frustrations produced in him. Social violence is likely to occur in cases of competition for scarce social values, when accommodative nature of society loses its viability. Deprivation denotes the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and 'is' of collective value satisfaction, disposing men to violence.


Most often, violence is the result of status discrepancy, that is, if men or groups are high on one dimension of social stratification but low on another, they are prone to violence

to attain equilibrated position on all dimensions. This phenomenon of status discrepancy is the characteristic feature of social mobilization and maldevelopment. These are the conditions when clusters of old socio-economic and psychological commitments are eroded and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour, generating the new kinds of social competition and scarcity, underlying contemporary antagonisms. Under the modernization process, a nation as such does not develop but only certain sections and groups, creating islands of prosperity in oceans of underdevelopment. This process is, in fact, maldevelopment, creating social tensions and increasing the scope for violence. In under-developed societies, the political elite, in order to hoodwink the masses so that they may forget the status discrepancy, widely expand political participation and politicize the socio-cultural, racial and communal cleavages. Men enter into conflict not because they are different, but because they are essentially the same. It is by making men more alike, in the sense of possessing the same wants, that modernization tends to promote conflict.

Whether by default, or due to high expectations inherent in its welfare nature, the political system is mostly held responsible for nearly all the social deprivations. At this stage, any group may regard the institutionalized procedures for expressing grievances as ineffective and inadequate. This is the process of the transformation of private problems into public issues, in which private discontent is politicized and then publicly acted upon to secure its redress.

Conditions conducive to conflict and violent outburst are there in present day societies. But violent outbursts do not always occur. Structural strain resulting from anxiety and frustration must be present in social conflicts to induce violence. The idea of action must spread through the group which shares the strain. Then, any dramatic event would precipitate action. Conflict between expectation and possibility is always latent, which comes into open in times of strain. Then, the result is violent, direct, action.

Thus it may be summed that man, by instinct, desires the attainment of desired values and objectives. Because of scarcity of social resources and values, it is not possible for every one to be satisfied. This leads to an inherent fear in each lest the other surpass him in goal-attainment, and this conflict is the result of a frustration, a deprivation of values. Because of it, the parties decide to destroy, subdue or drive away the opponent by means of threats or actual violence. In this way, violence becomes a technique, a tool, in the process of goal attainment. Since goal attainment is a political process (struggle for power), violence is a political technique to achieve goals and values.



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